Polarization or Consensus? Examining Immigration Policy Preferences



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To Mom and Dad

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Abstract

Immigration is becoming one of the most salient and divisive topics in American politics, and a range of specific issues—such as border security spending, legal status requirements, citizenship requirements, E-Verify, family separation, and temporary foreign worker visas—are now heatedly debated. But which of these issues are American citizens more concerned about, and which particular policies do they prefer? I examine these questions by conducting conjoint analysis, a method suitable for identifying multidimensional preferences. Although border wall funding dominated real-world politics when the survey was fielded, I find that family separation is the issue of top concern for Americans. Furthermore, I find that Americans' policy preferences are deeply polarized: the well-known "hidden consensus" on Americans' preferences of type of immigrants is not applicable to immigration policies (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). These results suggest that there exists discrepancies between preferences of politicians and voters, as well as between preferences for immigrants and immigration policies.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Immigration is becoming a more divisive and partisan topic in American politics. While Republicans and Democrats were equally likely to support decreasing legal immigration to the U.S. in 2006, Republicans are now twice as likely as Democrats to favor decreasing legal immigration (Pew Research Center 2018*b*). Support for current immigration policies is also divided; a recent poll shows that 30% of Americans support Donald Trump's immigration policies, 38% support the immigration policies of Democrats in Congress, and 24% support neither (The Washington Post 2018). Immigration policy view divisions mostly align along party lines. While 49% of Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents feel "unsympathetic" toward undocumented immigrants, only 13% of Democrats and Democrat-leaning Independents harbor the same attitude (Pew Research Center 2018*b*). Similarly, 47% of Republicans—compared to only 10% of Democrats—view providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants as a "reward for doing something wrong" (Pew Research Center 2018*b*).

But are Americans' opinions on immigration truly polarized? On what issues do they disagree more than others? Immigration is a multidimensional topic, and a range of specific issues are now fiercely debated. Which of these issues are American citizens more concerned about, and which particular policies do they prefer? More generally, what shapes Americans' views on immigration? In this thesis, I examine these questions by conducting conjoint analysis (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), a method suitable for identifying multidimensional preferences.

Previous literature shows that several factors play a role in shaping views on immigration and immigrants, one of which is individuals' perceived threat of immigrants (Wilson 2001). Perceived competition for resources, desire for group dominance, and beliefs in zerosum competition lead to negative attitudes on immigration (Esses et al. 2001; Hoskin 1991; Fetzer 2000; Binder, Polindard, and Wrinkle 1997). Specifically, Americans who perceive that immigrants threaten employment, economic growth, and national unity are more likely to support decreasing the level of immigration (Fetzer 2000; Wilson 2001). In particular, less-skilled native workers, who may perceive immigrants as a larger threat and competition to their jobs, are more likely to support limiting immigration inflow (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In contrast, Americans who believe that immigrants do not directly compete against Americans for jobs are more likely to support maintaining or increasing the level of immigration (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).

Individual characteristics of immigrants also influence immigration views among natives. Native citizens show greater support for immigrants from similar ethnic groups and opposition for immigrants from different cultural backgrounds (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Brunner and Kuhn 2018). Similarly, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) find that Americans display stronger preferences for educated immigrants in high-status jobs and opposition for immigrants who entered the U.S. without authorization, lack employment plans, are Iraqi, and do not speak English well.

Importantly, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) suggest that although Americans' preferences for immigrants depend on the characteristics of immigrants, their preferences vary little with *their own* characteristics. Instead, Americans who differ in partial partial partial partial preference of the type of immigrants gender, and age demonstrate a general consensus in preference for the type of immigrants they wish to admit. There is, however, still largely a debate around the "hidden consensus" on preferences for immigrants. Using a similar conjoint analysis, Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2016) show that Europeans' attitudes toward the type of asylum seekers they wish to admit are largely similar across respondent characteristics. In contrast, Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi (2019) also replicate Hainmueller and Hopkins's (2015) study in the context of France but show that natives' contact with immigrants moderate their views on immigration.

Given Americans have varying immigration attitudes and that recent immigration reform proposals are multidimensional, it is unclear what form of immigration policy packages Americans would support. To examine whether Americans' views on immigration policies are polarized—as the current political climate suggests—or in alignment, I conducted a survey experiment incorporating conjoint analysis. Using a nationally representative sample, I measure respondents' preferences for six immigration issues that were selected based on current events and legislative proposals—border security spending, legal status requirements, citizenship requirements, E-Verify, family separation, and temporary foreign worker visas. The survey experiment and its associated analyses provide an understanding as to what form of immigration policy individuals support, which attributes are salient in this decision, and whether preference and salience differ by respondent characteristics.

Overall, I find that across the six issues included in the survey, family separation is the most salient issue for Americans, despite the contentious debate over border security spending when the survey was fielded. In addition, the "hidden consensus" is largely inapplicable to immigration policy preferences. In general, the results suggest that individuals' preferences differ depending on whether they are asked to evaluate hypothetical individuals or broader policies. More specifically, preferences are polarized by respondents' attitudinal characteristics.¹ Though the results show evidence of a highly polarized political debate on immigration reform, I use predictive analysis to show that bipartisan compromise reforms

¹As I explain in a later section, however, respondents' views are more aligned when they are divided by demographic characteristics.

could still garner high levels of support among Democrats and Republicans.

In the following chapters, I first discuss in Chapter 2 the research design I used in my analysis. I provide an overview of my survey design and justify the use of conjoint analysis in my survey experiment to measure multidimensional immigration policies. In Chapter 3, I present the results for general immigration policy preferences and issue salience across all respondents. In Chapter 4, I show that preferences and issue salience differ by respondents' attitude characteristics but not demographic characteristics. In addition to providing evidence of a large polarization in preferences across partisanship, I examine the differences in preferences for individual immigrants and general immigration policies. I expand on the preference heterogeneity analysis in Chapter 5 by examining the moderating effect of proximity to the U.S.–Mexico border on support for border wall expansion. I conclude and suggest areas for future research in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2

Research Design

2.1 Conjoint Analysis

Conjoint analysis is a tool used to identify the causal effects of various components of a treatment in survey experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Originally used in marketing research, the method has several advantages compared to direct surveying. It allows researchers to simulate an information-rich environment, test various hypotheses simultaneously, evaluate the relative influence of each attribute value on the resulting choice, and limit concerns of social desirability bias (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2018). With these advantages, conjoint analysis has been widely used to examine policy preferences in various fields. For example, Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto (2018) use conjoint analysis to measure the preference of voters through policy bundles that comprise issue positions of political parties in Japan. In the healthcare services. Similarly, Carey, Clayton, and Horiuchi (2019) use conjoint analysis to examine individuals' preferences for campus diversity.

Because of its ability to simultaneously elicit opinions on several attributes within the same experiment, conjoint analysis is an appropriate tool to measure preferences for multidimensional immigration policies. Immigration policies often comprise several attributes. The Border Security and Immigration Reform Act proposed by the Republicans in 2018, for example, includes provisions for providing legal status to Dreamers who arrived in the U.S. as children, expanding the border wall, and preventing family separation in border detainment proceedings (Desjardins 2018). Given immigration policies' multifaceted nature, designs that incorporate multiple components and issue topics would provide a better understanding of Americans' holistic view on immigration.

Conjoint analysis also provides information about the relative importance of each attribute level (Ryan and Farrar 2000). As opposed to only understanding whether Americans support or oppose Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), conjoint analysis determines how the support for DACA compares with support for the DREAM Act and other policy proposals for providing legal status. Since there are often many proposals within a single topic in immigration policy, conjoint analysis permits policymakers to understand the relative ordering of policy preferences if respondents assess the policy package holistically. The method also demonstrates which particular policy for each issue garners the highest support among respondents.

In addition to providing a more realistic setting for multidimensional decision-making, conjoint analysis also mitigates social desirability bias. When asked directly about views on immigration policies, respondents are likely to answer in a way that is socially acceptable. Respondents often respond to sensitive questions with untruthful answers or completely refuse to answer (Lehrer, Juhl, and Gschwend 2018).¹ Given that immigration is growing increasingly partian and sensitive, it is difficult to elicit honest opinions about immigration policy through direct questioning. Conjoint analysis allows respondents to provide an

¹For example, individuals may respond favorably to questions about other racial and ethnic groups in order to appear unprejudiced and enlightened (Krysan 1998; Gilens, Sniderman, and Kuklinski 1998). Collegeeducated and high self-monitoring individuals are especially prone to social desirability bias and exert more effort to cultivate their public appearance (Janus 2010; Klein, Snyder, and Livingston 2004; Snyder 1987).

answer without revealing their specific preferences since respondents do not have to state their support for each attribute instead, they only need to evaluate each policy holistically. The method provides a high degree of anonymity, which encourages respondents to provide truthful preferences without the fear of conforming to a socially desirable answer (Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2018).

2.2 Statistical Methods based on Conjoint Analysis

Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) recently refined the method of conjoint analysis based on the potential-outcome framework of causal inference. The estimate they propose is the average marginal component effect (AMCE), which represents the marginal effect of a given attribute-level averaged across respondents and across all possible combinations of attribute levels. Although this is an effective approach to summarize multidimensional preferences, AMCEs are susceptible to the selection of baselines in subgroup comparisons. In other words, unless there is a theoretically-justified baseline for each attribute level, it is not suitable to use AMCEs to compare against subgroups (Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2019).

Given this issue, I calculate the marginal mean for each attribute-level (Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi 2019; Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2018), which measures the likelihood of choosing a particular profile given the presence of an attribute-level. Since marginal means do not rely on a baseline comparison within each attribute, each estimate is compared against the baseline value of 50%, which suggests that a proposal with the given attribute level will be chosen based on pure randomization. To determine preference heterogeneity, I divide respondents into subgroups based on their partisanship, ideology, views on Trump and current economic condition, immigration status, education, race and gender, and estimate marginal means within each group.²

 $^{^{2}}$ I define the first four characteritics as "attitude characeristics" and the latter four as "demographic

In addition to measuring the support levels of each attribute level, I also use the estimated marginal means to conduct predictive analysis. Specifically, I regress whether a policy is chosen on sets of attribute-level dummy variables.³ Within each attribute, the attribute levels that generate the highest estimates would yield the highest support level, and those with the lowest estimates would yield the lowest support. To calculate the support level of most and least favorable packages, I aggregate the intercept and the coefficient estimates of the most and least favorable attribute levels, respectively.

I also measure attribute salience, which represents the importance of an attribute in determining preferences. While preferences explain the support level for each issue, salience provides context as to how much respondents prioritize the topic when evaluating policy proposals. To calculate attribute salience, I use the method developed by Clayton, Ferwerda, and Horiuchi (2019) and measure the variation in the probability of choosing a profile with one of the attribute's levels. If an attribute has high salience, its average attribute-level marginal means, or the probability of choosing one profile over another, should deviate substantially from pure randomization, or 50%. In contrast, the attribute-level marginal means for an attribute with low salience should be closer to 50%. I also use bootstrapped confidence intervals to measure the differences in issue salience between subgroups of respondents.

2.3 Survey Experiment

I examine immigration policy preferences through a survey experiment administered on Qualtrics Panel between February 13 to March 21, 2019. Ninety-four percent of the sample collection was completed within one week after fielding. In the survey, respondents are asked to evaluate ten pairs of hypothetical policy proposals. They are requested to provide a binary characteristics.

³This model also includes a set of dummies for pre-stratified blocks that I generated for block randomization. See my explanation on the block randomization in the next section.

choice as to which policy proposals they would prefer the U.S. government to implement, and they are required to provide a favorability rating on a 1-7 scale for each policy.⁴ A sample conjoint task is shown in Figure 2.1.

Each policy proposal takes a stance on six issues: citizenship, legal status, border security, border detainment, E-Verify, and the temporary foreign worker program. These six attributes were chosen based on analyzing immigration policies proposed in the 115th Congress on GovTrack.us, statements by government officials, current events, and issues that have traditionally dominated immigration debates. For example, I include family separation policies given the topic received tremendous publicity from the Department of Justice's announcement of the zero-tolerance policy in April 2018 and the administration's subsequent policy reversal in June (U.S. Department of Justice 2018; Hegarty 2018).

For each policy, I developed a one-sentence description that represents possible stances taken on the issue.⁵ For family separation policies, I incorporated the zero-tolerance policy that allows family separation, the subsequent policy reversal that forbid family separation, and a new proposal by Trump that would provide parents the option to allow relatives to seek guardianship of their children (Miroff, Dawsey, and Sacchetti 2018). Citizenship requirements, which has been a part of the debate historically, include the options of the current *jus soli* policy, the French *jus sanguinis* policy that requires at least one parent to be a citizen, and the U.K. *jus sanguinis* policy that requires one parent to be considered "settled" (Serhan and Friedman 2018).

For legal status, I include variations of DACA, the DREAM Act, DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents), and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, as well as an option to provide no legal status. Border security spending, a hallmark of the Trump campaign, includes the options to decrease spending, maintain the current level of spending, increase spending without expanding the border wall, and increase

⁴For a detailed survey flow, see Appendix C.

⁵For complete attribute levels, see Tables D.2 and D.3 in Appendix D.

Case 1

Consider the following two hypothetical immigration policy proposals for **undocumented immigrants**.

Which policy proposal do you think should be implemented by the U.S. government? Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you would be more likely to prefer.

	Proposal 1	Proposal 2
Regarding the level of spending for border security,	decrease the level	maintain the current level
Provide citizenship for	only children born in the U.S. who have at least one U.S. permanent resident parent	only children who have at least one U.S. citizen parent
Regarding visas given to temporary foreign workers,	increase the number of visas	maintain the current number of visas
Regarding legal status,	grant undocumented immigrants who came to the U.S. as children deferred deportation for two years	grant undocumented immigrants who came to the U.S. as children, as well as their parents, deferred deportation for two years
In detainment proceedings for families who cross the border without a valid visa,	U.S. officials can separate any accompanying children from parents	parents can allow other relatives or guardians to seek custody of any accompanying children
Make E-Verify (a program that determines work eligibility of foreign employees)	a federal requirement for all businesses	a federal requirement for all businesses

Figure 2.1: A sample conjoint task shown to respondents in the survey experiment. *Respondents may be asked about "unauthorized immigrants," "undocumented immigrants," or "illegal aliens." Order of the attributes is randomized for each respondent but stays constant throughout the ten tasks. Levels for an attribute are randomized.*

spending and expand the border wall. E-Verify, which gained attention in an immigration bill proposed by the Gang of Eight in 2013, comprises the choices to designate the program a federal requirement, allow states to mandate program requirements, or allow the program to be optional. Lastly, the temporary foreign worker program, which was expanded by Trump in 2017 and again in 2019, consists of the options to increase, maintain, or decrease the number of visas, as well as eliminating all visas in the program.

Using block randomization, respondents are also assigned to one of three frames used to describe immigrants.⁶ They are informed that they will be asked to evaluate policies pertaining to either "unauthorized immigrants," "undocumented immigrants," or "illegal aliens." Since there is no standard method for describing undocumented immigrants, the media have used a variety of terms. "Unauthorized" is used by the Library of Congress, while "undocumented" is preferred by liberal groups and "illegal" is utilized by conservative organizations (Aguilera 2016; Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes 2013). The frames are used to mimic the different ways immigration policy is covered in the media, and the use of both liberal and conservative frames serve to balance the differences in partisan descriptions.⁷ The primary reason to randomize the use of one of these three terms in this survey experiment is to attenuate any bias due to the use of a specific term.⁸

The main survey was fielded after the 2018-2019 government shutdown and amidst at-

⁶Block randomization ensures that the demographic variables used to create strata will be balanced, and the technique improves the precision with which the average treatment effect is estimated (Gerber and Green 2012). Non-immigrant respondents are assigned to different frames through block randomization. Given the small sample size, immigrant respondents are assigned through complete randomization.

⁷I also use the frames to analyze whether framing affects preferences and expectations about undocumented immigrants. See Appendix A for the analysis.

⁸An alternative design is only to use the most "neutral" term, such as "unauthorized" in this case. But a possible issue is that survey takers may be more familiarized with other commonly used – and often politicized – words. By randomization, I can also test whether the specific wording affects the way in which participants responds to questions in the survey.

tempts to avert a second shutdown. Immigration, and in particular border wall funding, dominated the debates during the shutdown. In December 2018, Trump declared that he would not sign any funding bill that did not include provisions for extending the border wall and threatened to declare a national emergency in order to use emergency funds to expand the wall (Karni and Haberman 2019; Ferris and Bresnahan 2018). The shutdown ended on January 25, 2019, after a stopgap bill that did not include funding for the border wall was passed (Taylor 2019). A poll fielded during the shutdown finds that the public was divided over the question, as 52% of surveyed respondents believe that Trump should continue demanding border wall funding while 41% believe that he should compromise to end the shutdown (Clement and Balz 2019).

On February 15, two days after the launch of the main survey, Trump declared a national emergency at the border, which he deemed justified to stop the "invasion of drugs and criminals coming into our country" (Baker 2019). The national emergency declaration, which provides access to \$3.6 billion in military construction funds, likely increased the salience of border security spending as coverage on the shutdown pushed debate on the issue to the forefront (The White House 2019a).⁹

⁹The national emergency is still ongoing as of May 8, 2019.

Chapter 3

General Immigration Policy Preferences

I examine general policy preferences and attribute salience through two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 For each immigration policy issue, respondents have stronger preferences for policies that are more favorable toward immigrants than those that are less favorable.

Hypothesis 2 Across all immigration policy issues, border detainment (family separation) is the most salient for respondents.

Empirically, Hypothesis 1 implies that within each attribute, attribute levels that are more favorable toward immigrants have higher marginal means than attribute levels that are less favorable. Hypothesis 2 implies that across attributes, the variation in marginal means is largest for border detainment.

The support for increasing the level of immigration to the United States has steadily risen since 1997, and a 2018 Gallup poll shows that 75% of surveyed Americans believe that immigration is a "good thing" for the United States (Gallup 2018). As such, I expect that attribute levels that are more favorable toward undocumented immigrants, such as providing deferred action from deportation or permanent legal residency, to have higher marginal means than attribute levels that are less favorable, such as providing no legal status.

Similarly, respondents may weigh attributes differently when determining preferences. For example, messaging may influence issue salience by adding information, making particular information more accessible, or altering the weight of particular considerations (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). Since the family separation policy was the most recently debated topic when I constructed the attribute levels and formulated the hypotheses, I expected emotions and views on family separation to be the most easily accessible compared to other attributes.

Additionally, views on family separation may have the highest consensus among respondents. A 2018 poll find that 66% of respondents, including 91% of Democrats, 68% of Independents, and 55% of Republicans, oppose separating families during detainment proceedings (Matthews 2018). With a net support level of -40% and overall support level of 25%, the zero-tolerance policy has one of the lowest support levels compared to other controversial legislation such as the 2017 Tax Reform Bill, the 2017 Healthcare Bill, and the 2009 Stimulus Bill (Sides 2018). Since support among survey respondents are likely concentrated in opposition against the policy, family separation attribute levels likely have the largest variation in attribute-level marginal means. The news coverage of the protests, the issue's time proximity, and a general consensus on the topic across party lines may lead to a large values of marginal means for family separation.

3.1 Policy Preferences

In this section, I describe the results and provide context using current policy for each attribute. I also use the results to generate two policies that would garner the highest and lowest level of support among respondents.

Border security spending In general, respondents support increasing spending and oppose decreasing spending, suggesting that respondents support a level of border security at or above the present level. Evaluated as an entire group, respondents demonstrate the strongest support for increasing spending and expanding the border wall. The support diverges from earlier estimates, which show that 58% of Americans oppose expanding the wall (Pew Research Center 2019). The stronger support implies that either the actual level of support for expanding the border wall is stronger than previously estimated, support level differs when evaluated in conjunction with other policies, or that the level of support among those who favor expanding the wall is higher than those who oppose the measure.

Citizenship requirement Despite Trump's threat to revoke birthtright citizenship through an executive order, there are no significant differences in preferences for citizenship requirements (Axelrod 2018). Specifically, there is a general indifference between the current *jus soli* policy of the U.S. and the *jus sanguinis* policies of France and the United Kingdom, which require at least one parent to be a French citizen or considered "settled" in the U.K. (Serhan and Friedman 2018). Although Trump argues that citizenship by birth should not extend to undocumented individuals as they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" of the U.S. according to the Fourteenth Amendment, the estimates show a lack of support for his proposal (Jardina 2018).

E-Verify While selected states currently mandate E-Verify for all businesses, some reports show that the requirement is rarely enforced and fines are rarely assessed to firms violating the requirement (Newkirk 2018). Although Trump recently sought cuts to E-Verify funding, the results show that respondents prefer formalizing E-Verify into a federal requirement (Rainey 2019).

Family separation Across all respondents, there is strong support for keeping families together and banning family separation. The opposition is consistent with the public backlash and policy reversal in 2018. Following the release of a recording of separated children crying for their parents and allegations of forced medication and mistreatment, protests against the policy occurred across the country, including Washington, D.C.; Chicago, Illinois; El Paso, Texas; and New York City (Engelberg 2018; Yoon-Hendricks and Greenberg 2018). In June 2018, Trump signed an executive order that reversed family separation policies in detainment proceedings, and federal judges required immigration officials to reunite separated families within 30 days (Hegarty 2018).

Legal status requirements Preferences for legal status requirements largely align with recent policy proposals. Across various proposals, respondents express the highest support for providing permanent legal residency to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children. The most favorable attribute level is similar to the Dream Act of 2019, proposed by Senators Lindsey Graham and Dick Durbin, which seeks to provide conditional permanent resident status to Dreamers for eight years (Graham 2019). A variation of DACA, which provides deferred action to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children, garners the second highest level of support. The provision is included as part of the Republican proposal to end the 2018-2019 shutdown, which is discussed in Chapter 4.

Temporary foreign worker visas In contrast, preferences for temporary foreign worker visas are less synced with recent policy proposals. In March 2019, a group of senators led by Senators Susan Collins and Angus King requested that the Department of Homeland Security increase the number of visas to support small businesses in a tight labor market (Zaveri and Rueb 2019). However, the results suggest that respondents favor either maintaining or decreasing the current number of temporary foreign worker visas, and they are indifferent toward increasing the number of visas. Despite supporting a decrease in visas, respondents oppose eliminating the program in its entirety.

To summarize, the proposals that yield the highest and lowest level of support are shown

Attribute	Most favorable	Least favorable
Border security spending	increase spending and expand border wall	decrease spending
Citizenship requirement	born in the U.S.	born in the U.S., one U.S. permanent resident parent
E-Verify	federal requirement	optional program
Family separation	cannot be separated	can be separated
Legal status requirements	children, permanent legal residency	children and parents, permanent legal residency
Temporary foreign worker visas	maintain current number	eliminate all visas
Probability chosen	64.7%	31.2%

Table 3.1: Most favorable and least favorable policy packages. See Tables D.2 and D.3 for attribute level descriptions. Favorability is determined by regressing whether a policy is selected on dummy variables that represent each attribute level (minus one for each attribute). Probability chosen is calculated by aggregating the highest coefficients for each attribute.

in Table 3.1, and attribute level marginal means are shown in Figure 3.1.¹ In general, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Although respondents prefer certain policies that are more favorable toward immigrants, such as keeping families together in detainment proceedings and providing permanent legal residency to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children, they also support expanding the border wall and instituting a federal mandate for the use of E-Verify.

3.2 Attribute Salience

Figure 3.2 shows the estimated attribute salience. Although border security spending and border wall expansion in particular—garnered extensive coverage during the 2018-2019 shutdown, family separation remains the most salient issue despite the eight-month gap between the policy reversal and the fielding of the survey. As evident in Figure 3.2, family separation attribute levels can sway support levels for a policy proposal by 4.1 percentage points. The high salience may be attributable to general consensus around the issue, as individuals are generally opposed to family separation. As shown in Figures 3.1, E.2, and

¹Robustness checks, including interaction effects and eliminating the "maintain" categories, are included in Appendix B.



Figure 3.1: Policy preferences for all respondents. The estimates represent marginal means, or the probability of choosing a profile with a given attribute level. Estimates to the right of the vertical line show greater favorability. The horizontal range represents the 95% confidence interval.

4.1, the two attribute levels—"cannot be separated" and "can be separated"—yield the largest deviation from pure randomization, as individuals across both parties and ideologies oppose family separation.

Though the survey was fielded during a government shutdown that was dominated by debate over borders security spending, the issue ranks third in attribute salience. Compared to before the shutdown, buzz around the border wall was almost ten times higher at the onset of the shutdown and three times higher during the national emergency declaration (Google-Trends N.d.). The increase in interest around the issue did not translate to importance of the issue, as respondents are more concerned about family separation and the temporary foreign worker program. Despite being characterized by Trump as a "very important battle



Figure 3.2: Attribute salience for all respondents. The estimates represent the average of the absolute value of the deviation of an attribute's marginal means estimate from 0.5.

to win," border security spending is not a top priority concern for Americans, showing that there exists a discrepancy between the preferences and issue prioritization of politicians and their constituents (Mason and Gibson 2019).

Chapter 4

Preference Heterogeneity

In this chapter, I examine whether preferences for immigration policies differ depending on respondent characteristics. I focus on four attitude characteristics—partisanship, ideology, views of Trump, and views of current economic conditions—and four demographic characteristics—gender, education, immigrant status, and race.

4.1 Interaction with Respondent Characteristics

Despite the consensus across parties in preferences for characteristics of immigrants, current immigration policy preferences likely differs between Democrats and Republicans. Though a consensus on immigration policies may have existed prior to 2016, the deep partisan divide engendered by the election likely undermined that agreement. For example, a 2018 poll shows that 86% of surveyed Democrats feel sympathetic toward undocumented immigrants while only 48% of surveyed Republicans harbor the same attitude (Pew Research Center 2018b). Additionally, compared to other countries, the United States lacks a viable third party. As a result, anti-immigrant sentiments that may have been associated with radical-right parties in other countries are often channeled through the Republican Party (Kefford and Ratcliff 2018). A 2018 poll shows that 55% of Republicans support nativism, or the notion that countries should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group, compared to only 3% of Democrats (Kefford and Ratcliff 2018).

Similarly, respondents could also differ in preference by their views on Trump and current economic conditions. Similar to the partisan divide, those with different views of Trump may have polarizing views. While 87% of Republicans approved of Trump's second year performance in office, only 8% of Democrats expressed similar attitudes (Jones 2019). In addition, respondents who have an unfavorable view of current economic conditions may perceive immigrants as a threat to economic well-being and therefore display preferences less favorable to immigrants. Specifically, Citrin et al. (1997) and Wilson (2001) find that beliefs about the state of the national economy is a significant determinant of restrictionist sentiments. Individuals who have an unfavorable view of current economic conditions are more likely to view immigrants as threats to economic well-being and therefore display preferences less favorable to immigrants (Fetzer 2000; Wilson 2001).

Additionally, whether respondents are immigrants may influence their immigration preference views. Knoll (2009), for example, show that individuals who frequently attend religious services are also more likely to support liberal immigration reform policies, and members of minority religions are especially supportive of liberal immigration policies, perhaps empathizing with the plight of undocumented immigrants. Immigrants, similar to religious minorities, may empathize with the plights of undocumented immigrants and support policies more favorable to immigrants.

Results

Following the framework of Carey, Clayton, and Horiuchi (2019), I analyze views for each attribute level through four forms of consensus.¹ A strong consensus is defined such that each group obtains a marginal mean that is statistically distinguishable from the baseline, and

¹They use AMCEs to define the forms of consensus between subgroups of study participants. Here, I use marginal means, but the logic is essentially the same.

Consensus	Each group is significant	Difference is significant	Change in sign
No consongue	Falso		
no consensus	raise		
Mild consensus	True	True	False
Strong consensus	True	False	False
Polarization	True	True	True

Table 4.1: Characterization of consensuses (Carey, Clayton, and Horiuchi 2019)

the two groups both support or oppose a policy at a similar level (denoted by \checkmark). In a mild consensus, both groups obtain marginal means with the same sign that significantly deviates from the baseline, but the magnitude of their preferences differs (\ominus). In a polarization, each group obtains a marginal mean that is statistically distinguishable from the baseline, but the two groups disagree in the direction of support or opposition (\times). Lastly, a policy is characterized as having no consensus when at least one group obtains a marginal mean that is statistically indistinguishable from the baseline (—). The definition is summarized in Table 4.1.

The results of testing preference heterogeneity by different respondent characteristics are summarized in Table 4.2.² As opposed to be a consensus, there exists a large degree of polarization across parties, ideologies, and views on Trump and the economy, as evident in Table 4.2 (also see Figures 4.1, and Figures E.2 to E.4). Border security spending, citizenship requirements, and legal status requirements are the most polarizing attributes, while E-Verify, family separation, and temporary foreign worker visas policies obtain less disagreements. Despite the large polarization across respondents' attitude characteristics, there does exist a consensus across demographic characteristics, including education, race, gender, and immigrant status.

²Full result showing marginal means by respondent characteristic are shown in Appendix E.

Attributes and level	Partisanship	Ideology	Trump	Economy	Education	Gender	Immigrant	Race
Border security spending maintain spending increase spending but do not expand border wall increase spending and expand border wall decrease spending	×	×	×	×	>			
Citizenship requirements one U.S. citizen parent born in the U.S., one U.S. permanent resident parent born in the U.S.	×	× ×	×	×				
E-Verify state-by-state requirement optional program federal requirement					> >		>	
Family separation transferred to other relatives with parental consent cannot be separated can be separated	ΦΦ	Φ	0	$ \oplus \oplus$	>>>>	$\rightarrow \oplus \oplus$		>>>
Legal status requirements no legal status five years residency, permanent legal residency children, permanent legal residency children, deferred deportation children and parents, permanent legal residency children and parents, deferred deportation	$\times \times \mid \times \times \mid$	$\times \times \mid \times \times \mid$	× ×					
Temporary foreign worker visas maintain current number increase number eliminate all visas decrease number	①	>	×	>	> > >	> > >	>	> >
Note: \times denotes polarization, \checkmark denotes strong consto C ε	sensus, \ominus deno arey, Clayton, a	otes mild c and Horiu	chi (2019	$\frac{1}{2}$, and $-\frac{1}{2}$	enotes no co	onsensus.	Defined acc	ording

Table 4.2: Summary of preference heterogeneity



Figure 4.1: Difference in preference by partisanship. Marginal means are estimated separately among Republicans and Democrats. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).

Democrats and Republicans are polarized on many issues, as evident in Figure 4.1. Specifically, their views diverge on border wall expansion, birthright citizenship, and legal status requirements. However, they largely reach a consensus in their oppositions against family separation policies and the elimination of all temporary foreign worker visas. The consensus in family separation issues align with previous surveys. A poll found that 55% of Republicans would support family separation policies, compared to 66% of all respondents who would oppose the policy (Blake 2018). Though most Republican congressmen remained silent on the issue when it was heavily debated in June 2018, the results imply that there now exists a consensus on the issue (Phillips 2018).
Surprisingly, the border wall is not as polarizing as expected. Although the Republicans show strong support for the measure, the Democratic opposition is significantly smaller in magnitude in comparison. While previous surveys show that 85% of Democrats object to expanding the border wall and 72% of Republicans support the expansion, Figure 4.1 shows that the Democratic opposition against the border wall is significantly weaker than the Republican support for the wall (Tyson 2018).

Democrats and Republicans appear to disagree on every policy for citizenship requirement. Republicans favor requiring one U.S. citizen parent in order for a child to receive U.S. citizenship, followed by requiring one U.S. permanent resident parent. Preferences among Democrats are the exact reverse; they support the current *jus soli* policy and opposed putting any requirement on the status of the parent. The polarization on providing citizenship for all individuals born in the U.S. is consistent with recent public opinion polls, which show that 45% of Republicans favor eliminating birthright citizenship, compared to only 20% of Democrats (Jardina 2018). The support among Republicans manifested in a proposal by Trump to eliminate the measure through an executive order (Swan and Kight 2018). Though support for the policy varies among Republicans, the results here convey that on average, Republicans show general opposition toward birthright citizenship (Jardina 2018).

The most polarizing issue between Democrats and Republicans is legal status provisions. Across all possible requirements, Democrats favor granting permanent legal residence to immigrants who arrived as children and their parents, as well as individuals who meet the five-year residency requirement. The results are in line with the large Democratic support for providing permanent legal status, which is supported by 89% of surveyed Democrats (Doherty 2018). Though providing no legal status is Republicans' most preferred legal status policy, Democrats show overwhelming opposition against the measure. Though Republicans also show support for DACA, the policy provides the least degree of legal status to the most narrow group of individuals of all options in the attribute.

Attribute	Democrats			
Authority	Most Favorable	Least Favorable		
Border security spending	increase spending but do not expand border wall	increase spending and expand border wall		
Citizenship requirement	born in the U.S., one U.S. permanent resident parent	born in the U.S.		
E-Verify	federal requirement	optional program		
Family separation	cannot be separated	can be separated		
Legal status requirements	children, permanent legal residency	no legal status		
Temporary foreign worker visas	maintain current number	eliminate all visas		
Probability chosen	74.4%	21.4%		

Table 4.3: Most favorable and least favorable policy packages by Democrats. See Tables D.2 and D.3 for attribute level descriptions. Favorability for each party is determined by regressing whether a policy is selected on dummy variables that represent each attribute level (minus one for each attribute). Includes block fixed effects.

Attribute	Republicans			
Autoute	Most Favorable	Least Favorable		
Border security spending	increase spending and expand border wall	decrease spending		
Citizenship requirement	born in the U.S.	born in the U.S., one U.S. permanent resident parent		
E-Verify	federal requirement	optional program		
Family separation	cannot be separated	can be separated		
Legal status requirements	no legal status	children and parent, permanent legal residency		
Temporary foreign worker visas	decrease number	increase number		
Probability chosen	75.4%	23.9%		

Table 4.4: Most favorable and least favorable policy packages by Republicans. See Tables D.2 and D.3 for attribute level descriptions. Favorability for each party is determined by regressing whether a policy is selected on dummy variables that represent each attribute level (minus one for each attribute). Includes block fixed effects.

Using the marginal mean estimates, the most and least favorable policy package for each party is summarized in Tables 4.3 for Democrats and Table 4.4 for Republicans. Compared to the policy proposal most preferred across all respondents, the most favorable policies among Republicans and Democrat yield higher levels of support for each group. However, there is overlap between the most favorable policy of one party and the least favorable policy of the other party, which suggests that compromises have to be made in order to secure support across both parties.

The similarity between the partisanship and ideological divide indicates that the po-

larization is not attributable to a subset of individuals with extreme views. Specifically, most respondents identify as moderates—37.4%, compared to 33.4% as conservatives and 29.2% as liberals—and are therefore excluded from the comparison between conservatives and liberals in Figure E.2. In contrast, the sample contains a smaller proportion—20.7%—of self-identified Independents, meaning that 79.3% of respondents are included in the partisanship analysis. The polarization in policy preferences between Democrats and Republicans, despite the inclusion of respondents with self-identified moderate views, suggest that the polarization is present among the majority of respondents as opposed to a small portion of individuals with extreme views on the fringes of the spectrum.

There is also a large degree of polarization among individuals with different views of Trump. Views of Trump is highly correlated with partisanship, as 83% of surveyed Democrats hold an unfavorable view, compared to 67% of Republicans who hold a favorable view. An integral part of Trump's platform, the border wall has been a constant source of polarization in the political arena, with the 2018–2019 government shutdown as its latest source of contentious debate between the two parties. The results confirm the polarizing nature of the border wall expansion, as those with a favorable view of Trump overwhelmingly support the expansion while those with an unfavorable view of Trump oppose the measure, though at a significantly smaller magnitude. The divergence on support for birthright citizenship also aligns with Trump's proposal to eliminate the policy. The two subgroups are also polarized on their views of providing no legal status, providing legal status based on residency requirements, and increasing the number of temporary foreign worker visas.

In comparison, there is less polarization among respondents who differ on their views of the current economy. The only two polarizations occur on the issues of border wall expansion and birthright citizenship. They reach a mild consensus in opposition against family separation policies and a strong consensus in opposition against eliminating temporary foreign worker visas.

Despite the polarization in views by attitudes, there exists a consensus among respon-

dents when they are divided by demographic characteristics. Specifically, preferences largely align by education levels, similar to the finding of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015). Despite previous literature showing that low-skilled workers are more likely to hold restrictionist attitudes and although 50% of non-college graduates voted for Trump in 2016 (compared to only 38% of college graduates), non-college graduates do not necessarily hold stronger preferences for policies less favorable to immigrants (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Pew Research Center 2018*a*). Though non-college graduates are indifferent to expanding the border wall, college graduates show the strongest support for the measure. Similarly, college graduates are indifferent toward providing no legal status to undocumented immigrant, while there is some opposition among non-college graduates.

Similarly, men and women largely agree on the majority of issues presented. Though there appears to be many areas in which no consensus is reached between immigrants and non-immigrants, it can be attributable to the small sample size of immigrants. Despite only having 102 immigrants in the sample, the estimates show that there is strong consensus in terms of opposition against making E-Verify an optional program, support for keeping families together in detainment proceedings, and opposition against eliminating all temporary foreign worker visas.

In general, the consensus by demographic characteristics could be attributable to the distribution of attitude characteristics in across subgroups. For example, approximately 40.3% of women and 38.6% of men in the sample identify as Democrats. Similarly, 38.2% of immigrant respondents and 39.4% of non-immigrant respondents are Democrats. The even distribution of Democrats and Republicans may cancel out the partian preferences within each subgroup. As in, Democrat and Republican attitudes are equally represented in both groups, thus generating no significant subgroup differences.

In the sample, 45.3% of college-educated respondents have an unfavorable view of Trump, compared to 58.5% of respondents who did not attend college. As evident in Figure E.5, the preferences of college-educated individuals are slightly more aligned with those who

Attributes and level	Partisanship	Ideology	Trump	Economy	Education	Gender	Immigrant	Race
Border security spending	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				\checkmark
Citizenship requirements								
E-Verify	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark				
Family separation	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark		
Legal status requirements								
Temporary foreign worker visas								

Table 4.5: Summary of difference in attribute salience

Note: ✓ denotes a statistically significant difference in attribute salience by subgroup.

have a favorable view of Trump. Specifically, they demonstrate more support for border wall expansion and less support for providing permanent legal residency for immigrants who arrived as children and their parents.

In terms of race, 57.1% of non-white respondents and 28.7% of white respondents identify as Democrats. As evident in Figure E.8, white respondents exhibit preferences that align more with Republicans, such as supporting border wall expansion and mandating E-Verify for all businesses.

Salience Heterogeneity

Table 4.5 displays the difference in attribute salience by partisanship and ideology, in which \checkmark denotes a statistically significant difference in salience and — denotes no difference in salience between the subgroups.³ Border security and family separation have the largest differences in issue salience across subgroups. Compared to Democrats and liberals, Republicans and conservatives put a heavier emphasis on border security spending and E-Verify and a lighter emphasis on family separation. For both subgroup comparisons, legal status requirements are somewhat salient, and citizen requirements remain one of the least salient issues. Issue salience also differs by views on Trump and views on the economy and are similar to the partisan and ideological differences. Border security spending is the most salient issue for those with a favorable view of Trump and the economy. In contrast, family

³Figures for difference in salience by respondent characteristics are included in Appendix E.

separation is the most salient for those with an unfavorable view of Trump and the current economy.

In addition to the largest differences in issue salience by attitude characteristics, there are also a few statistically significant differences when respondents are divided by demographic characteristics. When respondents are divided based on race, border security is a more important issue for white respondents than respondents of another race, as evident in Figure E.16. This is attributable to the stronger support for border wall expansion among white respondents and indifference toward the measure among non-white respondents, as shown in Figure E.8.

Similarly, although family separation is the most important issue for both men and women, the magnitude is slightly higher for women compared to men. As evident in Figure E.6, women show stronger support for policies that would keep families together and strong opposition for policies that would separate families. The weak consensus on the issue suggests that although both groups oppose family separation policies, women are more adamant in their views on the issue.

4.2 Discussions

Though Americans' immigration policy preferences vary little with their education, gender, immigrant status, and race, they are polarized with respondents' partisanship, ideology, and views on Trump and current economic conditions. The above results provide evidence to support Hainmueller and Hopkins's (2015) assertion that contemporary disagreements over immigration are more about policies rather than people. Specifically, although Americans may reach a consensus on what characteristics of immigrants they prefer, the consensus is not applicable to immigration policy views.

For example, while respondents are more likely to picture individual immigrants who differ in country of origin and education levels when evaluating the hypothetical profiles in Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015), they are less likely to distinguish between immigrants of different characteristics when evaluating the policy proposals in this survey. Instead, respondents in this survey are more likely to perceive the immigrants affected by the policies through their own inherent biases and perceptions.

In a broader sense, the results contribute to literature surrounding political psychology and the formation of preferences by implying that there exists a divergence between individuals' views about tangible objects compared to abstract concepts. This divergence is also present in other fields. On the issue of campus diversity, Carey, Clayton, and Horiuchi (2019) show that individuals' preferences for affirmative action policies and preferences for types of faculty candidates or undergraduate applicants current students would prefer are different. In terms of charitable giving, respondents' perceived worthiness of welfare recipients differ depending on the race of the recipients shown as part of the charity's description (Fong and Luttmer 2011). When asked to evaluate support for individuals, respondents likely construct a hypothetical individual in their decision-making process on whom they base their views. The hypothetical individual is also shaped by the information provided in the questionnaire. For example, Hainmueller and Hopkins's (2015) conjoint tasks provide context-rich information about immigrants' gender, education, language, and other characteristics, while the policy proposals in this survey only refer to undocumented immigrants as a whole. As a result, they are less likely to distinguish between the different kind of individuals affected by the policies. Though both options ask respondents to evaluate the same group of individuals, respondents could provide differing answers depending on how they view the individuals at question.

In the policy aspect, the results reinforce Hainmueller and Hopkins's (2015) comment that the "hidden consensus" does not imply American policy-making will be harmonious. However, the results also highlight the importance of compromise. Given that different groups hold different opinions and place different values on issues, bargaining and compromise are essential in ensuring progress and reform.

Attribute	Trump (2019)	Gang of Eight (2013)	
Context	Proposed to end government shutdown	"2013 Comprehensive"	
Border security spending	increase spending and fund steel barriers	increase spending and fund wall	
Citizenship requirement	born in the $U.S.$	born in the $U.S.$	
E-Verify	state mandate	federal requirement	
Family separation	cannot be separated	cannot be separated	
Legal status requirements	children, deferred action	children, permanent legal residency	
Temporary foreign worker visas	maintain current number	new W-visa for low-skilled workers	
Probability chosen	60.6%	61.5%	
Democrats	59.8%	64.2%	
Republicans	65.6%	61.4%	

Table 4.6: Favorability of previously proposed policies. Probability that a policy is chosen is calculated through aggregating coefficient estimates on the attribute levels included in the proposal. If the proposal did not take a stance on an attribute, the status quo policy, displayed in italics, is assumed.

To provide more context, I conduct a predictive analysis on the support level for two previously proposed immigration reform policies. Table 4.6 shows the estimated support level for two "bipartisan" immigration reform bills—the Republican proposal to end the 2019 government shutdown and the bipartisan "2013 Comprehensive" bill proposed by the Gang of Eight—if they were proposed in February 2019.

Trump's plan to reopen the government after the 2018-2019 shutdown includes plans to increase border security through strengthening personnel and technology and extending the physical barrier (The White House 2019*b*). In exchange for Democratic support, the plan would also extend provisional status for undocumented immigrants who arrived as children. The 2013 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act was proposed by the Gang of Eight, which included four Republicans and four Democrats (Kurtzleben 2018). The bill passed the Senate but was not considered in the House and died in the 113th Congress.

Though both proposals were pitched as a compromise, the 2013 Comprehensive would garner a slightly higher level of support based on the calculated marginal means, especially among Democrats. Although Democrats oppose expanding the border wall, the inclusion of providing permanent legal status to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children increased the proposal's favorability. The convergence of support levels of Democrats and Republicans in the 2013 Comprehensive bill shows hope for crafting a compromise bill that would minimize differences in support between the two parties.

Despite the differences in views between Democrats and Republicans, the polarization does not signify that there is no prospect for an immigration reform bill. The estimated support level of the 2013 Comprehensive Immigration Reform bill shows promises of a compromise. The bill, crafted by a bipartisan group of congressmen, would garner the support of a majority of Democrats and Republicans. Despite the polarization, there is optimism that bipartisan reform policies can be constructed.

Chapter 5

Proximity to the Southern Border

In addition to the respondent characteristics examined above, policy views could vary based on distance to the physical border wall. Previous literature shows that proximity to the southern border could influence preferences. Newspapers in Californian towns closer to the U.S.–Mexico border feature more articles about immigration, especially ones that include negative aspects of immigration and feature undocumented immigration (Branton and Dunaway 2009). A recent survey also shows that Republicans who live closer to the border wall have lower support for expanding the wall (Jones 2017).

Expanding on the preference heterogeneity analysis, I examine whether support for border wall expansion differs by proximity to the U.S.–Mexico border and whether the moderating effect differs by party. I calculate distance through the centroid of respondents' self-reported zip-codes and limit the sample to include just profiles in which expand the border wall is included.

Figure 5.1 plots the relationship between distance to the border wall and favorability rating of policies that would expand the border wall. The locally estimated scatter-plot smoothing (loess) fitted values show that there is a significant difference in favorability ratings between those who live within 500 miles of the border and those who live at least 500 miles away. Specifically, respondents who live within 350 miles of the border provide



Figure 5.1: Loess fitting of distance and support for border wall expansion. Interval represents 95% confidence interval. Each tick mark on the x-axis represents an observation for the given distance.

a higher rating for policies that contain border wall expansion compared to those who live outside the range.¹

To further analyze whether proximity influences support for border wall expansion, I bin respondents according to their distance from the border and compare the support for border wall expansion among those within the closest bin and those in other bins. I bin respondents in three ways: using the bin by Jones (2017) (less than 350 miles, between 350 and 1,000 miles, and greater than 1,000 miles), by sample quartiles, and by sample quintiles. I then estimate the following model:

$$Rate_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot Closest + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{ij}, \tag{5.1}$$

 $Rate_{ij}$ is the rating provided to profile j by respondent i, and $Closest_i$ is a binary variable

¹I exclude outliers that live farther than 2,000 miles away from the border (in northern Maine), as well as individuals who live in Hawaii or Alaska, and respondents who did not provide zip code.

measuring whether a respondent is in the closest bin to the border. γ_i represents respondent characteristics, including education, party, gender, Hispanic origin, race, and immigrant status, and ϵ_{ij} is a random error term.

The results across all respondents are shown in Table 5.1.² There is a statistically significant difference between respondents within the bin closest to the border and other respondents when the Jones (2017) bins and quartiles are used.³ The positive and statistically significant coefficients on *Closest* implies that compared to other respondents, respondents who live within close proximity of the border are more likely to support expanding the border wall. Considering that policies that include border wall expansion have an average favorability rating of 3.97 and standard deviation of 1.69, the difference of 0.210 using the Jones (2017) bins represents a 0.124 standard deviation change in favorability.⁴

The difference in preference across distances could be attributable to the difference in news coverage and issue salience. Branton and Dunaway (2009) find that newspapers in cities closer to the border cover Latino immigration, especially its negative aspects, more frequently. As a result, individuals in regions within close proximity to the border are subjected to more negative media influences and thus are more likely to adopt restrictionist preferences. In addition, Hangartner et al. (2019) show that proximity to refugees' ports of entry in Greece, which is positively correlated with individuals' interactions with refugees, induces more hostility against refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities. Similarly, proximity to the border is likely indicative of respondents' exposure and interactions with undocumented immigrants, which Hangartner et al. (2019) suggests would lead to more hostile policy preferences against undocumented immigrants.

²As a robustness check, I compare favorability ratings of profiles that include border wall expansion and each of the other border security spending levels. The checks largely support the results in this section. For more details, see Appendix B.

³For a geographical depiction of the three types of bins, see Appendix B.

 $^{^{4}}$ As a robustness check, I also estimate the distance using the internal point of the zip code. The distances calculated through the two methods yielded a correlation of 0.999.

	Dependent variable:			
	Rate			
Bins	Jones (2017)	Quartile	Quintile	
Closest	0.210**	0.082	0.173**	
	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.086)	
Constant	4.026***	4.043***	4.025***	
	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.152)	
Observations	7,787	7,787	7,787	
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.043	0.041	0.042	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.	05; ***p<0.01		

Table 5.1: Differences in support for border wall expansion by proximity to southern border. Closest represents bin closest to the border. Controls for Hispanic-origin, education, race, party, immigrant status, and gender; standard errors clustered around respondent ID. Distance calculated by shortest path between centroid of self-reported zip code and border.

Mirroring the analysis by Jones (2017), I also estimate a difference-difference model in which *Closest* is interacted with separate binary variables for Republicans and Democrats. The results are shown in Table 5.2. The estimate on Democrats suggest that Democrats who live within 350 miles of the border support border wall expansion at a significantly higher rate compared to other Democrats. The lack of significance on the quartile and quintile estimates suggest that the effect is extremely local, as the cutoff for the two bins are 543 and 429 miles, respectively. The lack of significance on the estimates of Republicans suggest that the group is not heterogeneously affected, contrary to the finding of Jones (2017). In general, the results show that proximity to the southern border is associated with higher support for border wall expansion among all respondents.

	Dependent variable: Rate			
Bins	Jones (2017)	Quartile	Quintile	
$Closest \times Democrat$	0.459^{**} (0.228)	$0.076 \\ (0.211)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.355 \ (0.222) \end{array}$	
$\operatorname{Closest} \times \operatorname{Republican}$	0.271 (0.246)	-0.013 (0.221)	$0.216 \\ (0.236)$	
Constant	$\begin{array}{c} 4.121^{***} \\ (0.160) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.088^{***} \\ (0.165) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.110^{***} \\ (0.160) \end{array}$	
Observations Adjusted R ²	7,787 0.044	7,787 0.041	7,787 0.043	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Table 5.2: Effect of proximity on preferences by partisanship. Only interaction terms are shown for brevity. Coefficients on interaction terms represent the differences in support for expanding the border wall by distance to southern border. Independents are the excluded reference group. Controls for Hispanic-origin, education, race, party, immigrant status, and gender; standard errors clustered around respondent ID. Distance calculated by shortest path between centroid of self-reported zip code and border.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Although immigration is at the forefront of contemporary political debate, American's preference of immigration reform policies is largely unknown. This study examines immigration policy preferences through a survey experiment with conjoint analysis. By analyzing attribute level marginal means, this study is able to construct policy packages that would garner the most and least support among respondents and within each party. Although border security was heavily debate during the government shutdown when the survey was fielded, the analysis demonstrates that family separation policy is the top issue of concern for respondents.

Although Americans reach a consensus as to the type of immigrants they prefer to admit, this study suggests that Americans' preferences on immigration reform policies are largely polarized across attitude characteristics. Individuals who differ by party, ideology, and views on Trump and economic conditions disagree in preferences for border security spending, citizenship requirements, legal status requirements, and temporary foreign worker visa. However, there is a consensus in preferences across Americans who differ by demographic characteristics including gender, education, immigrant status, and race.

The results presented in previous chapters have several implications. This studies contributes to literature in political psychology by providing evidence that individuals' preferences for abstract policies and tangible matters may differ. Although Americans reach a strong consensus on the type of immigrants they favor, their views on immigration policies diverge along partisan and ideological lines. Depending on what kind of hypothetical individuals respondents base their decision-making process, their preferences may differ within the same topic. In line with the findings of Carey, Clayton, and Horiuchi (2019), the results provide an interesting area of future research in political psychology.

The result provides insight as to the moderating effect of distance on preferences. Specifically, Americans—both Democrats and Republicans—who live within close proximity to the southern border are more likely to support expanding the border wall. In particular, the significant local effect of distance provides an area of future research among the border states. Expanding on the results presented here and by Hangartner et al. (2019), future research can conduct a similar analysis on distance and exploit the geography of Texas, which is bordered by continental Mexico on one side and the Gulf of Mexico on the other.

Lastly, he results also provide evidence that the current political climate is polarized, especially on the issue of immigration. Despite evidence of polarization between Democrats and Republicans, however, there is still hope of a compromise. As evident in the estimated favorability of previously proposed bipartisan immigration policies, a compromise policy that minimizes the difference in favorability between the two parties is possible. Predictive analysis shows that the 2013 Comprehensive Immigration Reform bill, for example, would be supported by a majority of Democrats and Republicans in 2019. In addition, given that issue salience differs by partisanship, the results suggest that the two parties could reach a compromise in immigration reform policies based on the preferences and salience of different issues.

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Appendix A

Effects of Issue Framing on Preferences and Expectations

Extending on the results of Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013), I also use randomized framing treatments to examine the effect of framing on immigration policy preferences. Different immigration framing may elicit different emotions and perceptions respondents have of undocumented immigrants. "Undocumented immigrants" may elicit more favorable and sympathetic views while "illegal aliens" bring more hostile perceptions toward immigrants. Because different frames make different views accessible, immigration framing likely affects immigration policy preferences. I test the effect of issue framing by examining the differences in preferences and expectations of undocumented immigrants across treatment groups.

A.1 Framing and Immigration

Framing is the bridge between elite discourse and popular comprehension of an issue (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). There is no standard term used to describe undocumented immigrants, and several different frames have been used by the popular masses. In this study,

I focus on three commonly used terms that were previously examined by Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013): "unauthorized immigrants," "undocumented immigrants," and "illegal aliens." Used by the Library of Congress, "unauthorized" is often considered the most neutral of the three terms (Aguilera 2016). As of 2013, "illegal immigrant" remains the most widely used term to describe undocumented immigration, accounting for nearly half of the stories on undocumented immigration in that year (Guskin 2013).

Groups of different organized interest apply framing to convey a specific construction of an issue, often one that benefits the organization's own interests (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). In immigration policy debate, partial groups often use different frames to achieve different goals, as certain frames strengthen the division between in-group and outgroup members, especially encouraging in-group members to oppose policies that facilitate the inclusion of out-group members (Blumer 1958). Liberal media prefer "undocumented" rather than "illegal," arguing that the latter creates a negative and restrictionist connotation (Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes 2013). In contrast, conservatives prefer "illegal aliens" and argue that the term most accurately reflects the status of these individuals under U.S. immigration law (Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes 2013). However, "illegal alien" may be used to emphasize the status of out-group members by emphasizing immigration as an issue of legality. In his campaign and presidency, Trump repeatedly used "illegal immigrant" and "criminal alien" to generate more hostile public opinion against immigrants. In a 2017 rally in Miami, for example, he promised to "stop illegal immigration, deport all criminal aliens and save American lives" (Trump 2016). Aligned with his restrictionist immigration policies, "illegal" evokes a sense of criminality and stresses otherness, especially when used in conjunction with "criminal" and "aliens (Lakoff and Ferguson 2006).

The language used to describe undocumented immigration is shifting. The usage of "illegal immigrant" in newspapers decreased 17% from 1996 to 2013 while the use of "undocumented immigrant" increased 133% (Guskin 2013). Recognizing the potential effects of framing, many news and media outlets changed their policy on the language used to de-

scribe immigration. In 2013, the Associated Press updated its guidelines and forbid the use of "illegal" to describe a person (Colford 2013). The 2015 Times style guide also considered the use of "illegal immigrant" as "loaded or offensive" (Hiltner 2017). Critics of "illegal immigrant" believe that the term is dehumanizing, racially charged, and legally inaccurate. Drop the I-Word, a campaign against the use of "illegal immigrant," has succeeded in persuading USA Today and the Los Angeles Times, among other media outlets, to refrain from using the term to describe undocumented immigrants (Kohn 2014). In 2016, the Library of Congress also replaced "illegal aliens" with "noncitizens" and "illegal immigration" with "unauthorized immigration" (Aguilera 2016).

Since framing can be an important determinant of public opinion, it is commonly used in the political arena to advance certain attitudes and interests (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). Flores (2018) finds that Trump's 2016 presidential campaign announcement, which used derogatory descriptions of Mexican immigrants, negatively affected public opinion toward immigrants. Trump also used framing to evoke negative connotations of undocumented immigration during his 2019 State of the Union address. While he commented that "legal immigration enrich our Nation and strengthen our society," he emphasized the threat of "criminal illegal aliens" alled for an end to "illegal immigration," vowed to put "the ruthless coyotes, cartels, drug dealers, and human traffickers out of business" (Kopp N.d.). In contrast, though Obama also used "illegal" to describe immigration during his 2011 and 2012 State of the Union addresses, he used "undocumented" to describe individuals when announcing the passage of DACA (Kopp N.d.; Obama 2012).

In addition to government officials, partisan groups also use framing to convey certain attitudes and messages to the public. For example, the 2007 McCain-Kennedy bill, which provided legal status for undocumented immigrants, was branded as an "amnesty bill" by conservative media and a "path to citizenship" by liberal outlets (Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes 2013). The media can also influence individuals' views on immigration policy through framing. Americans tend to be poorly informed about immigration, and most of what they learn come through the mass media and its use of frames (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In general, the media—especially newspapers close to the southern border—has often portrayed immigrants in a negative light, invoking a sense of threat, crisis, and criminality (Branton and Dunaway 2009; Farris and Holman 2017).

Though Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013) find no discernible effect of using "unauthorized," "undocumented," and "illegal" on immigration policy support, the authors suggest that their null findings could be attributable to the low salience of immigration to Americans in 2013. The different terms used to describe undocumented immigration may have not been used frequently and therefore have not resonated with the public. Given that the salience of immigration has steadily increased since the 2016 election and different frames of undocumented immigration have been widely used to fit different agenda, the effect of framing may differ from the results of Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013).

A.2 Effect of Immigration Framing

In the survey, the framing treatment is given at the beginning and with each conjoint task. To ensure that respondents received the treatment, we ask an attention check question, which is discussed in Appendix C. Of the 1,406 respondents, 1,007 responded the attention check question correctly. Even if respondents provided the wrong answer, the treatment was shown to all respondents again to maximize exposure to the treatment. I test whether the treatment altered preferences through the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3 Compared to cases in which "unauthorized immigrants" is used, respondents have stronger preferences for policies unfavorable to immigrants when "illegal aliens" is used and stronger preferences for policies favorable to immigrants when "undocumented immigrants" is used. (Compared to "unauthorized immigrants," marginal means for attribute levels unfavorable to immigrants are higher when "illegal aliens" is used, and marginal means for attribute levels favorable to immigrants are higher when "undocumented immigrants" is used.)

To test Hypothesis 3, I look for differences in attribute level marginal means in each treatment group. Specifically, for each attribute level, I first subset the data to include only conjoint tasks that include that given attribute level. I then conduct a lack of fit F-test to test whether the inclusion of treatment group dummies would generate a better fit using

$$Selected_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot T2_i + \alpha_2 \cdot T3_i + \gamma_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{A.1}$$

where $Selected_i$ is a binary variable for whether a respondent *i* choose a profile *j*, $T2_i$ and $T3_i$ represent treatment group dummies, γ_i for block fixed effects, and ϵ_i for a random error term. I test the null hypothesis that $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = 0$, or that the probability of selecting a given profile does not differ by treatment group assignment. Since the observations within each individual are correlated, I calculate clustered standard errors where clusters are respondents.

The F-test shows that there is statistically significant differences in preferences among the treatment groups for three attribute levels. Views on citizenship by birth differ across the three groups, significant at the 5 percent level. Compared to 52.2% of individuals in T1, respondents in T2 are 2.74% less likely to choose a profile that provides citizenship for all individuals born in the U.S., and respondents in T3 are 2.93% less likely.

Views on legal status requirements also differ by treatment groups. Compared to 49.6% of T1 respondents who selects a profile that provides permanent legal residency for individuals who have resided in the U.S. for five years, T2 respondents are 1.81% less likely to do so, while T3 respondents are 2.28% more likely to choose that profile, significant at the 10 percent level. Compared to T1 respondents (46.4%), T2 respondents are also 4.36% more likely to support a policy that provides no legal status to undocumented immigrants, while T3 respondents are 1.17% less likely to support the notion. Given that there is statistically significant—though numerically insignificant—differences in only three attribute levels, framing treatment do not appear to generate a large difference in preferences across all respondents. The results

do not support Hypothesis 3 but are consistent with the results of Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013), suggesting that the recent immigration debate may not have sensitized individuals to the different frames.

Treatment Heterogeneity

Knoll (2009) finds that immigration framing has the largest effect on Republicans for whom immigration is an important issue, suggesting that framing effects could vary by partisanship. For example, the use of these frames seem to signal an individual's stance on immigration reform and encourage respondents to align themselves ideologically with partian views on immigration (Demby 2013). Democrats may react with more support for favorable policies upon the "undocumented immigrants" and "illegal aliens" frames, the first as a reminder for partian ideology and the second as an act of defiance against conservative ideologies.

Extending on Knoll (2009), the effect of framing could also differ by other respondent characteristics. Since framing activates individuals' existing beliefs and cognition rather than adding something new to their beliefs, negative immigration frames could reinforce individuals' predisposed hostile immigration views (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). Individuals who disapprove of Trump may hold more hostile predisposed views about undocumented immigrants, and their hostility may be strengthened by the use of less friendly immigration framing. When compared to the most neutral term "unauthorized immigrants," individuals who hold a more favorable view of immigration are more likely to support amicable policies when presented with the "undocumented immigrants" frame, and individuals who hold more hostile views are more likely to support restrictionist attribute levels when presented with "illegal aliens."

To examine how framing changes immigration policy preferences depending on respondent characteristics, I divide respondents by characteristics and treatment group. For each party, I calculate attribute level marginal means for within in treatment group and compare the differences in marginal means across treatment group. I characterize the effect of framing on preferences in three ways: a polarizing change, in which the direction of preference changes between the two groups; a mild change, in which the direction of preference remains the same but the strength of support changes between the two groups; no change, in which the direction and strength of support remains the same between the two groups.

There are some evidence that the use of "illegal aliens" increased the preference of policies less favorable toward immigrants in some subgroups.¹ Specifically, there is less support for DACA among women in T3 ("illegal aliens") compared to T2 ("undocumented immigrants"), and less opposition against family separation policies among college-educated individuals in T3 compared to T2. In addition, there is stronger support for expanding the border wall among respondents with a favorable view of the current economy in T3 compared to T1 ("unauthorized immigrants").

Frames have a large but mixed influence on the preferences of liberals. "Undocumented immigrants" increased the opposition against decreasing border security spending but also the support for decreasing the number of temporary foreign worker visas. In contrast, "illegal aliens" increased the support for providing permanent legal residency to those who have resided in the U.S. for five years. Although framing introduces polarizing differences in preferences, there is no conclusive evidence as to which direction each frame influences preference.

Despite some significant effects by other respondent characteristics, there is no evidence that immigration frames serve as prompts for individuals to align with party ideologies. For example, although "undocumented" is often used by the Democratic Party, Democrats do not necessarily adopt preferences more favorable to undocumented immigrants when the frame is used, as evident in the general lack of significant results in Figure E.18. There is an increase in the proportion of Democrats who believe the two groups of individuals commit violent crimes at a similar rate, significant at the 10 percent level. However, it is

¹Figures for the heterogeneous effect of framing on preferences by respondents are included in Appendix E.

difficult to discern from which answer option the migration is attributable to. There are also no significant differences in preferences between Republicans in T2 and T3, suggesting that individuals are either not very sensitive to different frames, or that the frames are not strong influences of policy preferences.

To test whether the significant differences described above are generated by chance, I also pool the attribute level differences estimated across treatment groups by each respondent characteristic and conduct a KS-test. With a p-value of 2.2×10^{-16} , the null hypothesis that there are no differences in preferences by treatment group is rejected. Despite the inconclusive result as to how and in which direction framing affects preferences, there appears to be differences in preferences among groups exposed to different frames.

Perception of immigrants

Similar to Hypothesis 3, framing treatments could change expectations of immigrants. Respondents exposed to "illegal aliens" may have a negative connotation of the immigrant population and expect undocumented immigrants to have lower education attainment and higher violent crime rates. In contrast, "undocumented" could evoke a sense of hope and dream. Especially for Democrats, the term could elicit the imagery of "talented, driven, patriotic young people," which was used by Obama in announcing DACA in 2012 (Obama 2012). I examine how expectations about perceived crime rates and education attainment change depending on framing treatment and respondent attributes by comparing respondents' perceptions of undocumented immigrants across treatment groups.

For expectations on crime rates, I run the following regression:

$$Native_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \times T2_i + \alpha_2 \times T3_i + \gamma_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{A.2}$$

where *Native* is a binary variable that is 1 if respondent *i* chose native-born U.S. citizens to commit crimes at a higher rate and 0 otherwise. T2 and T3 are binary variables that indicate whether a respondent is in those respective treatment groups, and γ represents block fixed



Figure A.1: QQ-plot of theoretical and actual p-values. The p-values associated with the differences in attribute level estimates across subgroups for each respondent characteristic are pooled and plotted against a uniform distribution of p-values.

effects. Finally, ϵ is a random error term.

For expectations on education levels, I estimate Equation A.2 and replace the dependent variable with *EducRate*, or the proportion of undocumented immigrants 25 years and older that respondents believe have a higher school diploma (GED equivalent). For both equations, the coefficients α_1 and α_2 represent the difference in outcome among treatment groups.

In general, the largest proportion of respondents—45.8%—expect native-born U.S. citizens and undocumented immigrants to commit violent crimes at the same rate, as evident in Table A.1. In comparison, 30.4% and 23.8% of respondents expect higher violent crime rate

Treatment	Native-born U.S. citizens	About the same	Undocumented immigrants
"Unauthorized immigrants"	32.3	45.1	22.6
"Undocumented immigrants"	30.3	46.8	23.0
"Illegal aliens"	28.7	45.6	25.7
All	30.4	45.8	23.8

Table A.1: Expectations of crime rates. Values represent the proportion of individuals in each treatment group who chose the selected answer. Includes block fixed effects.

by native-born U.S. citizens and undocumented immigrants, respectively. The results suggest that individuals do not necessarily associate criminality with undocumented immigrants.

Compared to respondents in T1 and T2, a smaller proportion of individuals in the "illegal aliens" treatment group selected native-born U.S. citizens and a larger share chose undocumented immigrants. A smaller proportion of individuals in T2 also expect native U.S. citizens to commit crimes at a higher rate. To also account for treatment heterogeneity, I estimate Equation A.2 among all respondents, Democrats, and Republicans.

Although the estimates across all respondents yield insignificant results, treatment appears to differ by partisanship. On average, a larger proportion of Democrats—44.1% compared to 18.8%—expect native-born U.S. citizens to commit crimes at a higher rates; however, the results suggest that Republicans are more responsive to framing. Specifically, the use of "illegal aliens" trigger a 8.3 percentage point decrease in the share of Republicans who chose native-born U.S. citizens, significant at the 5 percent level. The sizable decrease supports the notion outlined in Section A.1 that "illegal aliens" push Republicans to align with more restrictionist sentiments. In contrast, framing has no effect on expectations among Democrats. Although one may expect Democrats to adopt more favorable expectations when shown "undocumented," the proportion of individuals who chose native-born U.S. citizens remain relatively stable across treatment groups.

In terms of education, respondents believe that compared to an average U.S. adult, half as many undocumented immigrants—46.3%—have a high school diploma or GED equivalent, and Democrats provide a higher estimate—50.2% compared to 41.9%—than Republicans.

	Dependent variable: Native U.S. citizens All respondents Democrats Republicans			
Τ2	-0.020	-0.048	-0.031	
("Undocumented immigrants")	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.040)	
T3	-0.026	-0.015	-0.083**	
("Illegal aliens")	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.040)	
Constant	0.020	0.691***	0.166***	
	(0.142)	(0.105)	(0.054)	
Mean	0.304	0.441	0.188	
Observations	1,406	562	553	
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.015	0.028	

*Note:**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.2: Difference in crime rate expectations by treatment group. Coefficients represent the difference in probability of choosing a specific answer choice (native-born U.S. citizens, about the same, or undocumented immigrants) between a treatment group and "unauthorized immigrants." Includes block fixed effects.

Compared to respondents who were asked about "unauthorized immigrants," individuals who were asked about "illegal aliens" provided an estimate that was 5.06 percentage points less, significant at the 5 percent level. In particular, Republicans decrease their estimates by 5.25 percentage points when asked about "illegal aliens" instead of "unauthorized immigrants." The result is consistent with the effect on expectation of crime rates, as Republicans appear to update their expectations based on the terminology used to describe "undocumented immigrants" while the Democrats are not as sensitive to the frame used.

The results have several implications. First, the responsiveness of Republicans to "illegal aliens" suggests that the usage of term is cemented in party discourse. After the Library of Congress announced its intention to retire the use of "illegal aliens," Republicans in the House of Representative pushed for the LOC to reinstate the use of the term as part of

	Dependent variable:				
	Percent wi	Percent with high school education			
	All respondents	Republicans			
T2 ("Undocumented immigrants")	-0.266 (1.594)	-0.139 (2.552)	-1.576 (2.519)		
T3 ("Illegal aliens")	-3.046^{*} (1.596)	-0.263 (2.602)	-5.062^{**} (2.536)		
Constant	59.852*** (7.802)	53.635^{***} (5.291)	$33.941^{***} \\ (3.416)$		
Mean Observations	$46.3 \\ 1,406$	$50.2 \\ 554$	41.9 561		
Adjusted R ²	0.043 0.003				

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.3: Expectations of percent of undocumented immigrants with a high school diploma or GED equivalent. *Includes block fixed effects.*

the appropriations negotiation, citing that the language is more consistent with U.S. Code (Rahman and Rojas 2016). The debate suggests that Republicans are sensitive to the term used and align more with the usage of "illegal aliens." Similarly, the term is often used by the current leader of the party. Since he announced his presidential candidacy on June 15, 2015, Trump has used variation of "illegal aliens" in 71 tweets.²

Second, the use of "illegal aliens" elicits more restrictionist sentiments among Republicans. As outlined in Section A.1, the usage of "illegal" is often accompanied by "criminal" and descriptions of criminal activities. For example, a tweet by Trump on April 13, 2019 called for changes to sanctuary city policies that would take care of "illegal immigrants," including "Gang Members, Drug Dealers, Human Traffickers, and Criminals" (Brown N.d.). As such, the imagery accompanying the widely-used term is often one of criminality and neg-

 $^{^{2}}$ As of April 28, 2019.
ativity, thus prompting Republicans to evoke a a more hostile perception of undocumented immigrants.

Lastly, the general null results among all respondents suggest that most Americans have an ingrained image of undocumented immigrants, and descriptive terms make little difference on their perception of immigrants. Instead of prompting the reader to align with certain attitude and policies, different immigration frames only elicit a preexisting belief. Despite the various campaigns that are bringing attention to the consequence and impact of different descriptions, Americans are not very sensitive to the influence and connotation associated with the different terms. One policy implication that arises is that changes to perceptions of immigrants cannot be accomplished through changing the term alone; rather, the method through which individuals first develop their belief of immigrants must be changed.

Appendix B

Robustness Checks

B.1 Quantifying Preferences

As outlined in Appendix C, respondents are asked to select one policy proposal from each pair of proposals and provide a rating for each policy proposal. The continuous rating is helpful to differentiate between strict and weak dominance in preferences. For example, respondents may be largely indifferent between two policies, which would be reflected by the continuous rating for each policy, but select one proposal over the other from the pair in the binary rating. I examine how preferences may differ depending on which outcome variable is specified by regressing the continuous measurement on the binary measurement of preferences.

As evident in Figure B.1, there is a strong and positive relationship between preferences characterized through binary choice and continuous rating, indicating that both yield similar estimates for preferences. If there is perfect predictive power between the two quantification methods, then a scatter-plot of the two would yield a slope of 6. The flatter slope of the line of best fit, 2.526, suggests that individuals are more moderate in characterizing preference through a continuous rating and less likely to provide an extreme rating for individual policies.



Figure B.1: Relationship between preference quantified through binary choice and continuous rating. The x-axis represents preference characterized by binary choice, in which respondents are asked to choose one of two policies. The y-axis represents preference characterized by continuous rating, in which respondents are asked to rate each policy on a seven-point scale. The blue line represents the line of best fit, and the black line represents the line of perfect prediction.

B.2 Interaction Effects

Preferences for certain attribute levels may differ depending on what other attribute levels are included in the proposal. For example, if respondents highly oppose family separation, the inclusion of the attribute level in a proposal may automatically lead respondents to select the other policy. As a robustness check to the results outlined in Chapter 3, I also examine whether the inclusion of certain attribute levels change preferences of other attribute levels.

Since there are 23! different two-way combinations of attribute levels possible, I only test the interaction effects of two attribute levels that I expect to have an interaction effect increasing border security spending and expanding the border wall, and allowing family separation in border detainment. For each of the attribute level, I filter the sample to include only conjoint tasks in which one of the proposals includes the attribute level. I then estimate attribute level marginal means in the sample and compare the differences in marginal means against the full sample. A statistically significant difference in the attribute level marginal means between the two samples would suggest that policy favorability is highly dependent on the two attribute levels.

There appears to be no general interaction effects for increasing spending and expanding the border wall and family separation. As evident in Figures B.2 and B.3, the difference in attribute level marginal means between the limited and full sample is approximately zero, suggesting that despite controversy and polarization surrounding these two attribute levels, they do not appear to be completely indicative of favorability toward an entire policy proposal.

In addition to testing for interaction effects based on specific attribute levels of interest, I also conduct a robustness check to examine whether the "maintain" option in border security spending and temporary foreign worker visas biased the rank order of other attribute level preferences. For example, if a respondent strictly prefers increasing border security spending but is presented with two policies that propose to maintain or decrease spending. In this case, a respondent would choose to maintain current spending levels since it comes closer to his or her true preference.

I exclude conjoint tasks for which one or both policies have "maintain" as an option and compare the marginal means of the filtered group with the main group. As evident in



Figure B.2: Difference in marginal means with "increasing spending and expanding the border wall" removed. Tasks in which one or both of the profiles include the above attribute level are excluded. The values represent the difference in marginal means between the limited sample and full sample. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.

Figure B.4, there appears to be relatively no difference in border security spending. There is an increase in support for eliminating and decreasing the number of visas for temporary foreign workers, which suggests that the marginal means estimated in Figure 3.1 slightly underestimates the support toward a stricter visa policy. However, the magnitude of the difference suggests that there is largely no bias in the general results.

B.3 Expectations of Immigrants

In addition to constructing the outcome variable based on selection of "native-born U.S. citizens" in Appendix A.2, I also run the same regression for "about the same" and "undoc-



Difference between marginal means with allowing family separation and complete sample.

Figure B.3: Difference in marginal means with "families can be separated in border detainment" removed. Tasks in which one or both of the profiles include the above attribute level are excluded. The values represent the difference in marginal means between the limited sample and full sample. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.

umented immigrants" as robustness checks. For individuals who believe that undocumented immigrants commit violent crimes at a higher rate, choosing "about the same" would represent an improvement in perception of undocumented immigrants. Similar to Table A.2, framing does not appear to affect expectations across all respondents.

I also run the same robustness checks separately for Democrats and Republicans. Similar to the results in Appendix A.2, there is a significant effect of framing on expectations among Republicans but not among Democrats. Specifically, the use of "illegal aliens" increases the proportion of individuals who believe undocumented immigrant commit more violent crimes by 12.9 percentage points, a statistically and economically significant change.



Figure B.4: Difference in marginal means with "maintain" excluded. I exclude conjoint tasks that show "maintain" in either policy proposal and estimate the marginal means. The values represent the difference in marginal means between this limited sample and full sample. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.

B.4 Proximity to the Southern Border

To provide more context as to the quartile and quintile bins, Figure B.5 shows the distribution of bins across all respondents. As evident the figure, the significant moderating effect found in Chapter 5 is mostly located in the southern portions of the four border states.

As a robustness check to the results in Chapter 5, I compare the difference in favorability ratings for each border security spending issue across distance bins. For the border security spending attribute levels of "increase spending but do not expand border wall," "maintain current level of spending," and "decrease spending," I subset the sample to include only

	All respondents				
	Native U.S. citizens	About the same	Undocumented immigrants		
T2	-0.020	0.018	0.002		
("Undocumented immigrants")	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.027)		
T3	-0.026	-0.004	0.030		
("Illegal aliens")	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.027)		
Constant	0.020	0.693***	0.287**		
	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.132)		
Mean	0.304	0.458	0.238		
Observations	1,406	1,406	1,406		
Adjusted R ²	0.071	0.019	0.062		

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.1: Difference in crime rate expectations by outcome variable. *Coefficients represent* the difference in probability of choosing a specific answer choice (native-born U.S. citizens, about the same, or undocumented immigrants) between a treatment group and "unauthorized immigrants." Includes block fixed effects.

		Democrats	
	Native U.S. citizens	About the same	Undocumented immigrants
T2	-0.048	0.087*	-0.039
("Undocumented immigrants")	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.036)
Т3	-0.015	0.022	-0.007
("Illegal aliens")	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.037)
Constant	0.691***	0.166	0.143^{*}
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.074)
Mean	0.441	0.416	0.142
Observations	554	554	554
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.019	0.016	0.012

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.2: Difference in crime rate expectations by outcome variable, Democrats. Coefficients represent the difference in probability of choosing a specific answer choice (native-born U.S. citizens, about the same, or undocumented immigrants) between a treatment group and "unauthorized immigrants." Includes block fixed effects.

tasks in which the one profile includes the given level and the other is border wall expansion.

		Republicans	
	Native U.S. citizens	About the same	Undocumented immigrants
T2	-0.037	-0.053	0.090*
("Undocumented immigrants")	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Т3	-0.083^{**}	-0.046	0.129**
("Illegal aliens")	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Constant	0.168***	0.436***	0.396***
	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Mean	0.188	0.434	0.378
Observations	553	553	553
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	0.028	0.005	0.006

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.3: Difference in crime rate expectations by outcome variable, Democrats. Coefficients represent the difference in probability of choosing a specific answer choice (native-born U.S. citizens, about the same, or undocumented immigrants) between a treatment group and "unauthorized immigrants." Includes block fixed effects.

Similar to Chapter 5, I then estimate a difference-in-difference model that takes the form of

$$Rate_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \cdot Wall_j + \alpha_2 \cdot Closest_i + \alpha_3 \cdot Closest_i \times Wall + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{ij}, \tag{B.1}$$

where *Closest* is a binary variable that represents whether respondent *i* is placed in the distance bin closest to the southern border, *Wall* is a binary for whether profile *j* for respondent *i* includes border wall expansion, γ controls for respondent characteristics, and ϵ_{ij} is a random error term.

The results estimated using the Jones (2017) bins are shown in Table B.4. Compared to those who live close to the border, respondents who live farther away are less likely to support increasing spending and expanding the border wall compared to increasing spending but not expanding the border wall. However, they are also more likely to support border wall expansion compared to maintaining current spending.

I also estimate a triple-difference model by interacting each term in Equation B.1 with binary variables representing Democrats and Republicans. A significant estimate on the



(c) Quintile

Figure B.5: Bin assignment according to distances to border. *Different colors represents different bins.*

triple interaction term would indicate a significant moderating effect of distance on support for border wall expansion in one party. As evident in Table B.5, there is largely no significant difference in preferences between the farthest and closest group for both Democrats and Republicans. Combined with the results in Chapter 5, I find no evidence that distance has a moderating effect on support for border wall expansion within only one party. Instead, distance appears to have a moderating effect across all respondents.

	Dependent variable:				
	Favorability Rating				
	Increase, no expansio	on Maintain	Decrease		
Wall	0.024 (0.062)	0.101^{*} (0.059)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.172^{***} \\ (0.062) \end{array}$		
Closest	$0.111 \\ (0.103)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.516^{***} \\ (0.100) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.383^{***} \\ (0.096) \end{array}$		
Wall×Closest	0.288^{**} (0.145)	-0.406^{***} (0.139)	-0.226^{*} (0.134)		
Constant	$\begin{array}{c} 4.099^{***} \\ (0.124) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.178^{***} \\ (0.118) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.202^{***} \\ (0.111) \end{array}$		
Observations Adjusted R ²	$3,744 \\ 0.007$	$3,928 \\ 0.018$	$3,866 \\ 0.020$		
Note:	1*	p<0.1; **p<0.05	; ***p<0.01		

Table B.4: Differences in support for border wall expansion and other border security spending levels. Controls for respondent characteristics; standard errors clustered around respondent ID. Distance calculated by shortest path between centroid of self-reported zip code and border. Distance cutoffs are less than 350, between 350-1,000, and greater than 1,000 miles.

	Dependent variable:					
	Favorability Rating					
	Increase, no expansio	on Maintain	Decrease			
$Wall \times Closest \times Rep$	$0.028 \\ (0.369)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.374 \ (0.359) \end{array}$	-0.275 (0.351)			
$Wall \times Closest \times Dem$	$0.076 \\ (0.370)$	0.690^{*} (0.368)	0.033 (0.362)			
Constant	$\begin{array}{c} 4.024^{***} \\ (0.150) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.092^{***} \\ (0.143) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 4.059^{***} \\ (0.137) \end{array}$			
Observations Adjusted R ²	$3,744 \\ 0.030$	$3,928 \\ 0.039$	$3,866 \\ 0.051$			
Note:	*p	<0.1; **p<0.05;	***p<0.01			

Table B.5: Differences in support for border wall expansion and other border security spending levels by party. For brevity, only triple-interaction terms are included. Controls for respondent characteristics; standard errors clustered around respondent ID. Distance calculated by shortest path between centroid of self-reported zip code and border. Distance cutoffs are less than 350, between 350-1,000, and greater than 1,000 miles.

Appendix C

Survey Flow

The survey was fielded on Qualtrics and estimated to take less than 15 minutes to complete. A test sample of 150 respondents was collected on Mechanical Turk in January 2019, and a full sample of 1,406 respondents was collected on Qualtrics Panel between February 13 to March 21, 2019. Ninety-four percent of the sample were completed within one week after fielding. Quotas are imposed on partisanship, race, region, and education, and the sample is nationally-representative. Respondents must provide consent and be at least 18 years old to participate. The associated hypotheses and research questions were registered on EGAP prior to the start of survey collection (20190213AD).

At the beginning of the survey, individuals are first asked for their consent to participate. They are then asked for their age, and respondents younger than 18 years old are screened out. The remaining respondents are asked for their gender, highest level of school completed, Hispanic origin, and race. Subsequently, they are asked four moderating questions: whether they were born in the United States, the five-digit zip code of their current location, their views on Donald Trump, and their views on the current economic conditions.¹ The mod-

¹Moderating variables alter the direction or strength of the relation between a treatment and an outcome and are important in addressing "for whom" a treatment is more strongly related to an outcome (Frazier, Tix, and Barron 2004).

erating questions are asked before the conjoint tasks and framing treatment to avoid any priming effects. The last portion of the demographics question include interest in politics, ideology, and partisanship.

Using blocked randomization on partial partial

"On each of the following 10 pages, you will be given two hypothetical policy proposals for [unauthorized immigrants (T1) / undocumented immigrants (T2) / illegal aliens (T3)]. Please read each proposal carefully and select the one that you would prefer the U.S. government to implement."

To ensure that respondents receive the treatment, they are then asked on the next page which group of individuals—business executives, college students, or [unauthorized immigrants / undocumented immigrants / illegal aliens] the policies on the following pages pertain to, as in Figure C.2. Regardless of their answer, respondents are told again in Figure C.3 that "the policy proposals that will be given to you pertain to [unauthorized immigrants / undocumented immigrants / illegal aliens], or individuals in the U.S. who do not have a valid visa."

Respondents are presented with ten pairs of hypothetical policy proposals. Each proposal takes a stand on six issues related to undocumented immigration: citizenship, legal status, border security, border detainment, E-Verify, and the temporary foreign worker program. These six attributes were chosen based on analyzing immigration policies proposed in the 115th Congress on GovTrack.us, statements by government officials, and current events. For each topic chosen, I develop one-sentence attribute levels that cover most of the possible stances on the topic. Attributes are not referred to as specific policy names proposed in Congress in order to avoid overt partian attitudes toward that policy. For example, though two attribute levels correspond to the proposals in DACA and the DREAM Act, the levels

do not refer to these policies by name. The attribute levels are randomized for each policy profile, and the order of the attributes are also randomized for each respondent to avoid order effects. The attributes and levels are listed in Appendix D.

On the top of each conjoint task page respondents are reminded of the instruction:

"Consider the following two hypothetical immigration policy proposals for unauthorized immigrants (T1) / undocumented immigrants (T2) / illegal aliens (T3). Which of these do you think should be implemented? Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you would be more likely to prefer.

Respondents are first asked to make a binary decision between the two proposals. Since respondents may refrain from answering or provide an arbitrary answer if they dislike both proposals, they are also asked to rate how likely they are to support each proposal on a seven-point Likert scale. Respondents are asked to provide a binary choice but forced to provide continuous choice. The three questions presented for each conjoint task are:

"If you had to choose between them, which of these two proposals would you prefer the U.S. government to implement?" *Answer Options*: Proposal 1, Proposal 2

"Looking at just Proposal 1, how likely are you to support the U.S. government implementing this proposal?" *Answer Options*: Very unlikely, Unlikely, Somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, Somewhat likely, Likely, Very likely

"Looking at just Proposal 2, how likely are you to support the U.S. government implementing this proposal?" *Answer Options*: Very unlikely, Unlikely, Somewhat unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, Somewhat likely, Likely, Very likely

To further test the effects of framing, respondents are asked two additional questions about immigration after the conjoint tasks, as in Figures C.4 and C.5:

75

"In 2017, 90% of U.S. adults 25 years and older have a high school diploma (GED equivalent). What percent of [unauthorized immigrants / undocumented immigrants / illegal aliens] 25 years and older do you think have a high school diploma (GED equivalent)?" Answer Options: a continuous scale (slider) ranging from 0 to 100

"Which group of individuals do you think commit crimes at a higher rate?" Answer Options: [unauthorized immigrants / undocumented immigrants / illegal aliens], Native-born U.S. citizens, About the same

Following the questions testing expectations, respondents are provided an open-ended question to record comments, followed by debriefing of the survey.

On each of the following 10 pages, you will be given two hypothetical policy proposals for **unauthorized immigrants.** Please read each proposal carefully and select the one that you would prefer the U.S. government to implement.

>>

Figure C.1: Treatment assignment. Individuals are assigned to one of three immigration frames: "unauthorized immigrants," "undocumented immigrants," or "illegal aliens."

Before we begin: which group of individuals do the policy proposals that will be given to you pertain to?

business executives	
college students	
unauthorized immigrants	

Figure C.2: Treatment-related question. After individuals are given framing treatments, a manipulation check, in which they are asked which group of individuals the policies pertain to, is asked.

The policy proposals that will be given to you pertain to **unauthorized immigrants**, or individuals in the U.S. who do not have a valid visa.

>>

>>

Figure C.3: Answer to the treatment-related question. *Regardless of individuals' answers, they are provided their treatment frames again.*

What percent of unauthorized immigrants 25 years and older do you think have a high school diploma (GED equivalent)?										
In 2017 equiva	In 2017, 90% of U.S. adults 25 years and older have a high school diploma (GED equivalent).									
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
% of unauthorized immigrants with a high school diploma (GED equivalent)										

Figure C.4: Alternative outcome variable, education. After individuals complete the ten conjoint tasks, they are asked about their expectations of education attainment among undocumented immigrants. They are given a baseline comparison against average U.S. adults 25 years and older and asked to provide an answer between 0 to 100 percent.

>>

Which group of individuals do you think commit crimes at a higher rate?

Native-born U.S. citizens
Unauthorized immigrants
About the same

Figure C.5: Alternative outcome variable, crime. Individuals are also asked for their expectations on violent crime rates. They are asked to select which group of individuals commit violent crimes at a higher rate. Except for "About the same," the order of choices is randomized.

>>

Appendix D

Additional Tables

Characteristic	Sample	Characteristic	Sample
Age		Immigrant	
18 - 24	12.4%	Yes	7.3%
25 - 34	25.0%	No	92.7%
35-44	23.3%	Party	
45-54	16.4%	Democrat	39.4%
55-64	13.0%	Republican	40.0%
65-74	7.7%	Independent	20.7%
75-84	2.0%	Ideology	
85 or older	0.1%	Conservative	33.4%
Gender		Liberal	29.2%
Woman	51.8%	Moderate	37.4%
Man	48.2%		
Education			
Below college	61.9%		
College and above	38.1%		

Table D.1: Survey sample demographics

Provide citizenship for

all children born in the U.S.

only children who have at least one U.S. citizen parent

only children born in the U.S. who have at least one U.S. permanent resident parent

Regarding legal status,*

grant "unauthorized immigrants" who came to the U.S. as children deferred deportation for two years

grant "unauthorized immigrants" who came to the U.S. children, as well as their parents, deferred deportation for two years

grant "unauthorized immigrants" who came to the U.S. children permanent legal residency grant "unauthorized immigrants" who came to the U.S. children, as well as their parents, permanent legal residency

grant "unauthorized immigrants" who stayed in the U.S. for at least 5 years permanent legal residency

do not grant "unauthorized immigrants" any legal status

Regarding the level of spending for border security,

increase the level, and expand the U.S.-Mexico border wall increase the level, but do not expand the U.S.-Mexico border wall maintain the current level decrease the level

In detainment proceedings for individuals who cross the border without a valid visa,

U.S. officials can separate any accompanying children from parents

U.S. officials cannot separate any accompanying children from parents

parents can allow other relatives or guardians to seek custody of any accompanying children

Make E-Verify (a program that determines work eligibility of foreign employees)

a federal requirement for all businesses a requirement for businesses on a state-by-state basis an optional program for all businesses

Regarding visas given to temporary foreign workers,

increase the number of visas maintain the current number of visas decrease the number of visas eliminate all visas

Note: In "Regarding legal status," respondents will be shown one of the frames—unauthorized immigrants, undocumented immigrants, illegal aliens—depending on treatment group assignment.

Table D.3: Conjoint attributes and levels—shortened text

Citizenship requirements

born in the U.S. one U.S. citizen parent born in the U.S., one U.S. permanent resident parent

Legal status requirements

children, deferred deportation children and parents, deferred deportation children, permanent legal residency children and parents, permanent legal residency five years residency, permanent legal residency no legal status

Border security spending

increase spending and expand border wall increase spending but do not expand border wall maintain spending decrease spending

Family separation

can be separated cannot be separated transferred to other relatives with parental consent

E-Verify

federal requirement state-by-state requirement optional program

Temporary foreign worker visas

increase number maintain current number decrease number eliminate all visas

Appendix E

Additional Figures



Figure E.1: Marginal means through continuous rating of proposals. *Respondents are re*quired to score each policy proposal on a 1-7 scale.



Figure E.2: Difference in preference by ideology. Marginal means are estimated separately among liberals and conservatives. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.3: Difference in preference by views on Trump. Marginal means are estimated separately among those with favorable and unfavorable views of Trump. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.4: Difference in preference by views on the economy. Marginal means are estimated separately among those with favorable and unfavorable views of the current economy. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.5: Difference in preference by education. Marginal means are estimated separately among those with below college and above college education. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.6: Difference in preference by gender. Marginal means are estimated separately among women and men. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.7: Difference in preference by immigrant status. Marginal means are estimated separately among immigrants and non-immigrants. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.8: Difference in preference by race. Marginal means are estimated separately among those with favorable and unfavorable views of the current economy. Green represents strong consensus (same direction and level of support), black represents mild consensus (same direction but different level of support), red represents polarization (opposite direction of support), and grey represents no consensus (insignificant estimates for one or both groups).



Figure E.9: Attribute salience by partial partial salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.10: Attribute salience by ideology. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.11: Attribute salience by views on Trump. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.12: Attribute salience by views on the economy. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.13: Attribute salience by education. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.


Figure E.14: Attribute salience by gender. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.15: Attribute salience by immigrant status. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.16: Attribute salience by race. Salience for each attribute within each group is calculated by averaging the absolute value of the deviation of attribute levels within the attribute from 0.5. The deviation of a specific estimate from the 45-degree line represents the difference in salience of an attribute between the two groups.



Figure E.17: Differences in preferences by treatment group, Republicans. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.18: Differences in preferences by treatment group, Democrats. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.19: Differences in preferences by treatment group, Independents. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.20: Differences in preferences by treatment group, Liberals. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.21: Differences in preferences by treatment group, Conservatives. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.22: Differences in preferences by treatment group, Moderates. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.23: Differences in preferences by treatment group, unfavorable view of Trump. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.24: Differences in preferences by treatment group, favorable view of Trump. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.25: Differences in preferences by treatment group, favorable view of the current economy. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.26: Differences in preferences by treatment group, unfavorable view of the current economy. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.27: Differences in preferences by treatment group, below college. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.28: Differences in preferences by treatment group, college and above. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.29: Differences in preferences by treatment group, women. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.30: Differences in preferences by treatment group, men. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.31: Differences in preferences by treatment group, immigrants. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.



Figure E.32: Differences in preferences by treatment group, non-immigrants. For each party, marginal means is estimated for each treatment group and compared. Point range represents 95% confidence interval.